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INTRODUCTION 
The Open Educational Resources (“OER”) initiative has 
inspired various institutions throughout the world to create and 
maintain large repositories of digital teaching, learning, and 
reference materials.  As the size of these repositories increases, so 
do the costs and administrative tasks associated with their 
maintenance and servicing of multiple end-users accessing the 
materials.  To further the objectives and mission of the OER 
movement, it is necessary to consider alternative sustainable 
storage and distribution models available to participating and 
interested universities from cloud providers.  A cloud solution 
provides several advantages to repositories, including 
consolidation of available resources in a single location, increased 
accessibility, and flexibility to the repository data centers.  Not 
only are these solutions cost effective for the repository, a cloud 
solution may provide automation and self-service options which 
effectively improve overall function and performance for end users 
of OER materials.  Importantly in the OER context, cloud 
solutions may further encourage global resource-sharing and 
collaboration, and improve the underlying quality and usefulness 
of the resources.  Cloud solutions are both innovative and 
disruptive, but not without risk to the repository.  Accordingly, it 
is important to assess the protections and potential pitfalls 
associated with a repository’s implementation of a cloud solution 
for its educational resources. 
This Article will summarize the content-related risks associated 
with cloud hosting of educational content repositories, address how 
existing law may provide protection to the repository and cloud 
provider and what the parties must do to take full advantage of 
such protections, set forth best practices to mitigate remaining risk, 
and propose how that remaining risk should be contractually 
allocated between the parties.  Among other relevant contractual 
terms, we will address traditional contract risk-allocation terms, 
including representations and warranties, covenants, disclaimers, 
limitations of liability, indemnification, and insurance.  The 
Article will focus on whether and how the fact of cloud storage and 
distribution may increase the risk of liability to the repository and 
what practices can be adopted to mitigate any increased risk.  We 
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will define how various available tools can be used to incentivize 
the repository and cloud provider to each adopt policies, 
procedures and practices, designed to minimize risks under 
applicable law, and take advantage of protections already available 
under current law to mitigate risk and provide each party with the 
proper incentive to move forward with cloud sourcing for OER in 
a manner that furthers the movement. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Cloud computing offers a business solution designed to cut 
costs and provide operational agility.1   Through this economic 
model, shared resources, software, content, data, and other 
information are provided to cloud customers (that is, repositories) 
on demand in elastic quantities pursuant to a metered process.2  
Today, cloud-service solutions support operations in many 
industries and are arguably well-suited for addressing business 
needs faced by the education industry during a time of increasing 
global connectedness and competitiveness amid growing 
accessibility and digital-divide concerns.3   As a cloud solution 
necessarily involves some loss of control to the cloud user, any 
increased legal and business risk associated with the solution will 
vary to some degree based on the type of information to be cloud 
sourced. 4   For example, regulated industries, such as financial 
services and healthcare, face increased concerns around breach of 
confidentiality, privacy, and security due to the sensitive and 
regulated nature of the applicable content, and must carefully 
allocate those risks and liabilities in any agreement with a cloud 
                                                                                                             
1 See Lisa Angelo, Exploring Legal Issues at High Altitudes: The Law in the Cloud, 
20 CURRENTS INT’L TRADE L.J. 39, 41–42 (2011). 
2 See id. at 40. 
3 See Thomas G. Wilkinson Jr., Ethical Obligations for Attorneys Using Cloud 
Computing/Software As a Service While Fulfilling the Duties of Confidentiality and 
Preservation of Client Property, 34-JUN PA. LAW 49, 55 (2012); Charles M. Horn & 
Chris Ford, Are Financial Institutions Ready for Cloud Computing?, BLOOMBERG BNA 
(Jan. 8, 2013), http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/are-financial-
institutions-ready-for-cloud-computing. 
4 See Jay P. Kesan, Carol M. Hayes & Masooda N. Bashir, Information Privacy and 
Data Control in Cloud Computing: Consumers, Privacy Preferences, and Market 
Efficiency, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 341, 363–64 (2013). 
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provider.5  For institutions with educational content repositories, 
the more significant risks relate to digital rights management and 
potential liability for intellectual property infringement and 
content-based tort claims, such as defamation and false-light 
privacy, and regulation of obscenity, indecency, and other 
actionable speech.6 
As will be discussed below, there are several legal concepts 
and related tools available to the repository and cloud provider to 
mitigate many of these content-based legal risks.  As each concept 
is discussed, we will propose best practices and compliance 
requirements necessary to take advantage of the full protections 
afforded by such laws, and suggest how the contractual risk-
allocation might be best structured to ensure that each party has a 
responsibility to help mitigate risk associated with the solution.  
Best practices will include suggestions for disclaimers, notices, 
licensing models, contractual provisions, and technical tools.  We 
will discuss the respective roles and responsibilities of the 
institution seeking to outsource its repository and the cloud 
provider, how the legal concepts provide protection to each, 
identify gaps, and discuss how certain acts by either party could 
void or compromise protections available under current law.  
When parties have equal bargaining power, these risk allocation 
provisions are most effectively used to place liability on the party 
in the best position to mitigate the related risk. 
While the other risk-related contract provisions play a role, 
ultimately parties to a contract rely on indemnification to allocate 
and manage risk.  To indemnify another party is to compensate 
that party for loss or damage that has already occurred, or to 
guarantee through a contractual agreement to repay another party 
for loss or damage that occurs in the future.7  Indemnification 
clauses will often include an obligation to defend, requiring the 
indemnifying party to assume the defense of the claim. 8  
                                                                                                             
5 See J. Nicholas Hoover, Compliance in the Ether: Cloud Computing, Data Security 
and Business Regulation, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 255, 256–57 (2013). 
6 See discussion infra Parts II, III. 
7 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 837 (9th ed. 2009). 
8 See Thomas MS Hemnes, Intellectual Property Indemnity Clauses 2013 B.C. 
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 1, 22 (2013). 
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Depending on the complexity of the indemnification provision, the 
indemnified party may have the right to participate in the defense 
at its own expense. 9   A thoughtful indemnification provision 
should specifically address and allocate the identified and agreed 
risk associated with the specific business arrangement and avoid 
imposing risks that are unclear, shared, or relatively minor. 
As a starting point for defining contractual risk allocation, it is 
important to consider the current business model and related risk, 
how that risk changes by moving to the cloud, how each party 
benefits from the commercial arrangement, and which party is in 
the best position to mitigate the key risks. 10   With respect to 
current risk, OER repositories may be open or closed, yet there is 
little doubt that the repository bears the content-related risks 
associated with its proprietary hosting of the content.11  In open 
systems, the university allows users of OER materials outside the 
immediate community to access, use, and publish information, 
whereas a closed system allows only members of the university 
community to engage in those activities.  With a closed system, 
there is arguably less anonymity, possibly resulting in a greater 
sense of control over the end-user base on the back-end and a 
greater degree of buy-in from users of OER materials on the front-
end. 
The application of privacy policies and terms-of-use 
documents is common practice and considered to constitute best 
practices for online services, including institutions with OER 
repositories.12  The posted privacy policy advises the end user as 
to how the repository may collect, use, share, and store the data it 
receives from the end user through the user’s input of data and its 
use of the service, as well as how the end user may access and 
                                                                                                             
9 See id. 
10 See Consolidated Audit Trail Rule, SEC Comments on Proposed Rule No. 34-
62174, 2010 WL 3492680 (proposed on Aug. 9, 2010). 
11 See CTR. FOR EDUC. RESEARCH AND INNOVATION, GIVING KNOWLEDGE FOR FREE: 
THE EMERGENCE OF OPEN EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES 115–16 (2007), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/edu/ceri/38654317.pdf. 
12 See Hoover, supra note 5, at 271.  See generally AMERICAN UNIVERSITY CENTER 
FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, CODE FOR BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE FOR OPENCOURSEWARE (Oct. 
2009), available at http://www.cmsimpact.org/sites/default/files/10-305-OCW-Oct29.
pdf. 
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update certain data. 13   The repository’s posted terms and 
conditions inform users of OER materials of the purpose of the 
service, how it may be used, identify limitations and restrictions 
applicable to the service, define certain procedural remedies for 
suspected infringement, and establish the end user’s 
responsibilities in connection with such use.14  In order to be part 
of an effective risk-management strategy, these documents should 
be customized by the interactive service provider (that is, the 
repository) to fit the specific circumstances and provide 
meaningful disclosure to the end user.  Whether or not these 
documents are effective tools to shift major risks to individual end-
users remains open for discussion with respect to enforceability 
and practical utility, but at a minimum, they can serve the valuable 
purpose of disclosure when written and posted effectively. 
Understanding and categorizing the types of content included 
in a given repository is an important first step in the risk-analysis 
process.  Examples of different content types that impact related 
risk from a copyright perspective include materials owned by the 
institution, materials contributed from members of the university 
community, and materials contributed by members outside the 
community.15  Arguably, as control over the materials diminishes 
across the groups, the risk of copyright-infringement liability 
increases.  In an effort to address copyright concerns, many of the 
major OER repositories are encouraging end users to create and 
publish works to repositories under the Creative Commons 
authorization model.16 
                                                                                                             
13 See Jay P. Kesan, Carol M. Hayes, and Masooda N. Bashir, Cloud Services, 
Contract Terms, and Legal Rights, 17 J. INTERNET L. 3, 8 (2013). 
14 See id. 
15 See CTR. FOR EDUC. RESEARCH, supra note 11, at 46. 
16 See generally AMERICAN UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, supra note 12, at 
1.  The Creative Commons license is based on copyright and generally applicable to 
works that are protected by Copyright law, although it was designed for use with content 
assets, not software assets.  There are multiple versions of the license available for use 
by an author, but the least restrictive and most favored from an OER perspective is the 
ShareAlike version, which is somewhat analogous to the GNU General Public License 
for open-source software.  All Creative Commons licenses allow others to copy, 
distribute, and make some uses of their work, and ensure that authors can be credited for 
their work.  Additional permissions may be granted to specifically allow commercial 
use, creation of a derivative work and/or require republication of the derivative work.  
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As to how existing risk to the repository changes with the 
implementation of a cloud solution, certainly there is risk inherent 
in the greater public access, visibility and utilization of repository 
content.17  However, this risk alone should not justify an arbitrary 
shift of liability.  Further, relationships between a repository and 
cloud provider may differ in many important respects, each of 
which may suggest a different allocation of risk and disclosure-
based tools to support the agreed allocation. 18   Given that 
contractual risk arguably represents another form of compensation 
paid by one party to another, it is important to understand the 
economic benefits derived by each party in connection with the 
particular relationship.  Ultimately, this requires an understanding 
of each party’s respective role and opportunity. 
As will be discussed below, the availability of certain 
protective legal tools and doctrines will depend on each party’s 
role, responsibilities, and rights under the contract.  Specifically, it 
is important to understand and define whether each party plays a 
passive or active role in the creation of the available repository 
content, and perhaps to differentiate such role from the party’s role 
in the collecting, storing, and providing that content through the 
hosted platform.  It is our opinion that the protections offered to 
an “interactive service provider” under the Communications 
Decency Act (“CDA”) far outweigh the potential liability, 
provided that the “interactive service provider” does not originate 
or add to the material on the web.  Furthermore, the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA’) provides temporary 
immunity to what it calls “internet service providers” 19  from 
                                                                                                             
By requiring users to publish under this architecture, repository users will have a 
common understanding of the rights granted in the database, and use of the built-in 
software tagging feature that provides some limited digital rights management 
functionality.  While use of the Creative Commons license provides a clear path for 
works that are entirely original to the author, there is still risk associated with any pre-
existing works included in published content and other circumstances where the author 
simply does not have the rights necessary to license the work. See About The Licenses, 
CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses (last visited Sept. 27, 2013). 
17 See Hoover, supra note 5, at 261. 
18 Id. at 258. 
19 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) 
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (the DMCA calls the service an “internet 
service provider”).  The services in the CDA and the DMCA are basically the same. 
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liability for copyright infringement until the service or its agent 
receives notice from the copyright holder or its representative, 
provided that the sample is not so egregiously known that it is clear 
that it infringes.20  In addition, a recent “fair use” case has held 
that digital works are a different market from a traditional paper 
work because of the searching and “text mining” capabilities, and, 
therefore, are free from infringement under the “fair use” 
doctrine.21 
II. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT (CDA) 
A. Immunity for Third-party Postings 
The Communications Decency Act (CDA) was added to the 
law in 1996,22 largely in response to Stratton Oakmont Inc. v. 
Prodigy Services Co.,23 in which an “interactive service provider” 
was held liable for material that was posted on the service by a 
third party because the provider “monitored” the content on the 
site.24  The CDA eliminated the liability for state law causes of 
action for content that was posted by third parties.  The CDA has 
a number of provisions, including section 230(c)(1) which 
provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider.”25  
There is also section 230(c)(2) which provides that: 
No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be held liable on account of – 
any action voluntarily taken in good faith to 
restrict access to or availability of material that the 
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, 
                                                                                                             
20 See Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 27–28 (2d Cir. 2012) 
[hereinafter YouTube II]. 
21 See Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
22 Pub. Law No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996), codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
23 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 94-CV-31063, 1995 WL 
323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). 
24 Id.  The monitoring was meant to prevent offensive, obscene, indecent, or 
infringing material from being on the Internet. 
25 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012). 
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lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing or 
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such 
material is constitutionally protected; or 
any action taken to enable or make available 
to information content providers or others the 
technical means to restrict access to material 
described in paragraph (1).26 
Section 230(f)(2) further provides that the term 
[I]nteractive computer service [means] any 
information service, system, or access software 
provider that provides or enables computer access 
by multiple users to a computer server, including 
specifically a service or system that provides access 
to the Internet and such systems operated or 
services offered by libraries or educational 
institutions.27 
And finally, section 230(f)(3) provides that the term 
“information content provider” means “any person or entity that is 
responsible, in whole or in part, for the for the creation or 
development of information provided through the Internet or any 
other interactive computer service.”28 
The first case to test the CDA was Zeran v. America Online, 
Inc.29  The Fourth Circuit affirmed the proposition that AOL was 
a “provider” and not a “publisher,” and restated the ideology of the 
CDA: 
Congress recognized the threat that tort-based 
lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in the new and 
burgeoning Internet medium.  The imposition of 
tort liability on service providers for the 
communications of others represented, for 
Congress, simply another form of intrusive 
government regulation of speech.  [Section] 230 
                                                                                                             
26 Id. § 230(c)(2). 
27 Id. § 230(f)(2). 
28 Id. § 230(f)(3). 
29 958 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff’d, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. 
denied., 524 U.S. 937 (1998). 
636 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 24:627 
	
was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature 
of Internet communications and, accordingly, to 
keep government interference in the medium to a 
minimum.30 
The CDA has been upheld again and again to immunize 
“interactive service providers” from material that has been posted 
by third parties.31 
The CDA was given its broadest and most expansive 
interpretation by the California Supreme Court in Barrett v. 
Rosenthal.32   In that case, the California Supreme Court made 
several important observations regarding the statutory language of 
the CDA.33 
Rosenthal was a party who redistributed allegedly defamatory 
posts on a website, even after receiving notice that the messages 
might be defamatory.34  The Court recognized that Rosenthal is 
not a “service provider,” but a “user” of Internet services.35  The 
case appears to be “the first published case in which section 230 
immunity has been invoked by an individual who had no 
supervisory role in the operation of the Internet site where the 
defamatory material appeared.  Rosenthal was also clearly not an 
‘internet service provider’ under the broad definition provided in 
the CDA.”36  The California Court was faced with the question of 
whether there was any difference under the CDA between active 
                                                                                                             
30 Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 
524 U.S. 937 (1998).  Congress made the legislative choice to treat Internet publishers 
differently from corresponding publishers in print, television, and radio for two primary 
reasons, the first being “to encourage the unfettered and unregulated development of free 
speech on the Internet, and to promote the development of e-commerce.” Batzel v. Smith, 
333 F.3d 1018, 1026–27 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 
F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003).  
31 See, e.g., Black v. Google, Inc., 457 Fed. Appx. 622 (9th Cir. 2011); Blumenthal v. 
Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998); Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816 
(2002); Barrett v. Fonorow, 343 Ill. App. 3d 1184, (2d Dist. 2003); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 
146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006). 
32 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006). 
33 See id. at 526–29. 
34 See id. at 513. 
35 See id. 
36 Id. at 514. 
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and passive users.37  The court looked at the statutory language of 
the Act and determined that “Congress employed the term ‘user’ to 
refer simply to anyone using an interactive computer service 
without distinguishing between active and passive use.” 38  
Therefore, sending an allegedly defamatory remark to others 
unchanged39 would also be fully immunized under the CDA.  The 
Court first recognized that “distributor” liability would have a 
dramatic chilling effect on Internet service providers, and that 
Congress did not intend to create such an exception to section 230 
immunity.40 
We share the concerns of those who have expressed 
reservations about the Zeran court’s broad interpretation of section 
230 immunity.  The prospect of blanket immunity for those who 
intentionally redistribute defamatory statements on the Internet has 
disturbing implications. Nevertheless, by its terms, section 230 
exempts Internet intermediaries from defamation liability for 
republication. The statutory immunity serves to protect online 
freedom of expression and to encourage self-regulation, as 
Congress intended. Section 230 has been interpreted literally.  It 
does not permit Internet service providers or users to be sued as 
“distributors,” nor does it expose “active users” to liability.41 
The only remedy that was left for the plaintiffs was “pursuing 
the originator of the allegedly defamatory publications.”42  With 
respect to contributions posted on the repository site by third 
parties (that is, individual end-users), it would appear that both the 
repository and cloud provider would be interactive service 
providers eligible for immunity from liability for defamation 
arising out of third-party postings in the repository provided that it 
does not create or add to the posting by a third party.  For clarity, 
this immunity would not be available to the educational institution 
                                                                                                             
37 See id. at 513 (“We further hold that section 230(c)(1) immunizes individual ‘users’ 
of interactive computer services, and that no practical or principled distinction can be 
drawn between active and passive use.”). 
38 Id. at 515. 
39 As we shall see later, there are questions of CDA immunity when the service or a 
user adds editorial comment to the message. 
40 See Rosenthal, 146 P.3d at 529. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
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with respect to content provided by the institution to the repository, 
but would still be available to the cloud provider.43 
B. Liability Under the CDA for Being in Whole or in Part a 
“Content” Provider 
Those few cases in which there has been liability under the 
CDA—and there are only a few—involved cases in which the 
“interactive service provider” crossed the line and was involved in 
creating content, as well as merely hosting content.44 In Fraley v. 
Facebook, Inc., members of the social network website with 
hundreds of millions of users worldwide filed suit against the 
owner of the website alleging that its advertising practice of 
placing members’ names, pictures, and assertions that they “liked” 
certain advertisers of other members’ pages constituted, inter alia, 
a violation of California’s Right of Publicity Statute, California’s 
Unfair Competition Law, and the common law of unjust 
enrichment. 45   The CDA, which provides broad immunity to 
websites that publish content provided by third parties, did not bar 
the claim against Facebook for misappropriation based on 
Facebook’s unauthorized use of the members’ photographs and 
names for advertising purposes.46 
Because Facebook was both an “interactive computer service” 
and an “information content provider,” it was ineligible for 
complete immunity under the CDA.47  While it provided computer 
access to millions of users to its service, Facebook went beyond its 
traditional function when it took members’ names, photographs, 
and likenesses without their consent and used the information to 
create new content that it published as endorsements of third-party 
products and/or services. 48   Thus, although the CDA provides 
broad immunity to websites that publish content provided by third 
parties, a website operator can lose its statutory immunity if it 
                                                                                                             
43 See id. 
44 See cases cited supra note 30. 
45 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 790 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
46 See id. at 800. 
47 See id. at 801. 
48 See id. 
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creates, or is responsible, in whole or in part, for creating new 
content that it provides to the users.49 
In Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.com, L.L.C.,50 the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held 
that the CDA did not provide immunity from state law causes of 
action because the defendants, “required subscribers to the site as 
prospective landlords or tenants to include information that was 
illegal under the Fair Housing Act.”51  For example, those posting 
to the site “had to fill out a questionnaire indicating racial, gender, 
family-status and sexual-orientation preferences for the apartments 
they wished to rent or rent out.”52  The Ninth Circuit held that by 
imposing this requirement, “Roommate [sic] becomes much more 
than a passive transmitter of information provided by others; it 
becomes the developer, at least in part of that information.” 53 
Immunity was also denied in Federal Trade Comm’n v. 
Accusearch, Inc.,54 where the site sold various personal data, also 
violating federal law.55 
In Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, L.L.C., the 
plaintiff, a school-teacher and a cheerleader for the Cincinnati 
Bengals, asserted defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress causes of action against the owner 
and operator of a website named “thedirty.com” for (1) 
encouraging the posting of offensive material; (2) commenting on 
the offensive material itself; and (3) promising to remove, but not 
                                                                                                             
49 See id. 
50 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
51 Id. at 1165. The Fair Housing Act of 1968 makes it illegal: 
(c) To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or 
published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the 
sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, 
or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, 
familial status, or national origin, or an intention to make any such 
preference, limitation, or discrimination. 
42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2012). 
52 Roommates.com, L.L.C., 521 F.3d at 1165–66. 
53 Id. at 1166. 
54 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009). 
55 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012). 
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removing, the offensive material.56  Upon learning of the post, 
plaintiff emailed the website and requested that the post be 
removed because she was concerned that it could affect her job.57  
After initially receiving a response stating that the website would 
remove the post, plaintiff was told that the post would not be 
removed. 58   The second post had made allegations that the 
plaintiff had venereal diseases. 59   The defendant had written 
comments about the postings themselves and placed them on his 
site.60  Plaintiff again requested that the site take down the posts.61  
Her requests were ignored, and the plaintiff subsequently filed 
suit.62 
The court held that the defendant “edits” the site and selects a 
small percentage of submissions for publication. 63   More 
importantly, the defendant adds his own comments and opinions as 
to what he thinks of the various postings on the site.64  Based upon 
“the name of the site, the manner in which the site was managed, 
the personal comments of defendant [ . . .], the defendants have 
specifically encouraged the development of what is offensive about 
the content of the site.”65 
As the above cases indicate, if third parties provide content, 
there is no liability for merely being an “interactive service 
provider.”  This is true, it would appear, even if the service is 
made aware of something containing content that would violate 
state law such as defamation, the right of publicity, and the rights 
of privacy.  However, should the repository or cloud promise to 
remove something, and not follow through, liability under a 
contract theory may attach.66  It is important to carefully consider 
                                                                                                             
56 See Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1009 
(E.D. Ky. 2012). 
57 See id. 
58 See id. 
59 See id. 
60 See id. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 See id. at 1012. 
64 See id. 
65 Id. 
66 See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1108–09 (9th Cir. 2009) (Although the 
CDA eliminated all claims related to Yahoo! being a publisher, a contract claim based on 
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this risk when drafting the terms of use and privacy policy for the 
repository. 
Although there have not been any reported CDA cases dealing 
with the “text searching” capability, there has been one reported 
case67 in which the scanning of entire texts and giving them digital 
text searching capability has been held to be a “fair use,” and, 
therefore, not an infringement of copyright.68  It is doubtful that 
merely providing text-searching capability would cause one to rise 
to the level of an “information content provider.”69  We believe 
that far more would be required before the service meets the 
requirement of “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole 
or in part, for the creation or development of information provided 
through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”70  
If correct, this should provide some comfort to the cloud provider 
in its role of aggregating repository content and facilitating search 
across repositories. 
In conclusion, the CDA provides beneficial protection for both 
the repository and cloud provider in each party’s role as an 
interactive service provider.  The institution should carefully 
select the content contributed by it to the repository and 
contractually retain responsibility for state law claims arising in 
connection with such institution’s content in its agreement with the 
cloud provider.  Given the broad immunity provided under the 
CDA, neither party should be obligated to indemnify the other for 
content-related liability under state claims arising in connection 
with the third-party postings, except to the extent its actions render 
it an information content provider with respect to the content 
giving rise to the liability.  As noted earlier, the repository owner 
                                                                                                             
Oregon law’s “promissory estoppel” theory was allowed to proceed: “[I]nsofar as Barnes 
alleges a breach of contract claim under the theory of promissory estoppel, subsection 
230(c)(1) does not preclude her cause of action.  Because we have only reviewed the 
affirmative defense that Yahoo! raised in this appeal, we do not reach the question 
whether Barnes has a viable contract claim or whether Yahoo! has an affirmative defense 
under subsection 230(c)(2) of the Act.”). 
67 See Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see also 
discussion infra Part IV.D. 
68 See Authors Guild, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 465. 
69 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2012). 
70 See id. 
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should post thoughtful terms of use intended to minimize misuse of 
the service by users, and require each user to affirmatively agree to 
comply with those terms in connection with its use of the site.  
The repository owner’s practical exposure to claims for which its 
users are ultimately responsible will exist whether it hosts the 
content on its servers or through a cloud provider.  This risk 
should be managed by the repository with quality control tools at 
the front-end.  Such tools may limit publication rights to a 
restricted population (i.e., a closed community), require 
publication pursuant to a Creative Commons license, and include 
recordkeeping features to track publications by user. 
III. DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT (DMCA) 
Just as the CDA was passed in response to the decision in a 
case, so, too, was the DMCA.71  The DMCA was passed in direct 
response to Religious Technology Center v. Netcom Online 
Communications Services, Inc. in which the company that merely 
provided the connection to the Internet was held to be potentially 
liable, and not merely a conduit.72  Several years before Netcom, 
two Bulletin Board Services (“BBS”) were held liable for 
copyright infringement for uploads and downloads of files by their 
subscribers in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena 73  and Sega 
Enterprises, Ltd. v. MAPHIA.74 
As part of the DMCA, Congress passed the Online Copyright 
Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA), now codified in 
Section 512 of the Copyright Act. 75   An “Internet Service 
                                                                                                             
71 See Sean Croman, Where the Netcom Yardstick Comes up Short: Courts Should Not 
Apply the Facts of Netcom as an Example of Intermediate and Transient Storage Under S 
512(a) of the DMCA, 80 WASH. L. REV. 417, 417 (2005); see also Viacom Int’l Inc. v. 
YouTube, Inc., No. 07-CV-2103 (LLS), 2013 WL 1689071, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 
2013) [hereinafter Youtube I] (The CDA provides absolute immunity to “interactive 
service providers” from state law claims for material posted by third parties; the DMCA 
provides limited immunity for “internet service providers” for copyright infringement 
until the ISP has received proper notice from the copyright holder). 
72 See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom Online Commc’ns Serv., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 
1361, 1382 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see also Croman, supra note 71, at 417. 
73 See 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993). 
74 See 948 F. Supp. 923, 933 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
75 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
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Provider” will not be liable for infringement for (1) transitory 
digital network communications; 76  (2) system caching; 77  (3) 
information residing on systems at the direction of users;78 and (4) 
information location tools79. 
For our purposes, we are mainly concerned with section 
512(c), information residing on systems at the direction of users.  
Section 512(c) contains the “notice and takedown” provisions, 
providing that an Internet service provider cannot be liable until it 
has been put on notice of the alleged infringement.80  Once on 
notice, if the Internet service provider “responds expeditiously to 
remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be 
infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity” it will not be 
liable. 81   In order to be eligible for invoking the safe harbor 
protections, an ISP must meet the conditions set forth under 
section 512(i).82  The Internet service provider must show that it: 
(A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and 
informs subscribers and account holders of the 
service provider’s system or network of, a policy 
that provides for the termination in appropriate 
circumstances of subscribers and account holders of 
the service provider’s system or network who are 
repeat infringers;83 and 
                                                                                                             
76 Id. § 512(a). 
77 Id. § 512(b). 
78 Id. § 512(c). 
79 Id. § 512(d). 
80 The safe harbor provision of the DMCA states that a “service provider shall not be 
liable for monetary relief” if all of the following requirements are met: 
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material on its 
network is infringing; 
(ii) . . . it is not aware of facts or circumstances that would make the 
infringing activity apparent; or 
(iii) upon obtaining knowledge or awareness of such infringing 
activity, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access . . . the 
[copyrighted] material . . . . 
Id. § 512(c). 
81 Id. § 512(c)(1)(C). 
82 See id. § 512(i). 
83 An example of notification from the MITx terms of service: 
If you expect copyright infringement has occurred at MIT, pursuant 
to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, electronic notifications 
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(B) accommodates and does not interfere with 
standard technical measures.84 
Most of section 512(c) of the DMCA is relatively 
straightforward.  There is no liability until either the service 
provider or its agent receives notice.85  What is not so clear is 
what happens when content that was put on the service by a third 
party is so egregiously infringing that a party should have known 
that it infringes, and should take it down.  Must the service 
provider wait for a notice of infringement, or must the service 
provider take it down anyway?  A brief discussion of the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.86 and the 
                                                                                                             
about the unauthorized online use of copyrighted materials should be 
sent by email to dmca-agent@mit.edu. 
If you do not include an electronic signature with your claim, you 
may be asked to send or fax a follow-up copy with a signature. To 
file the notification, you must be either the copyright owner of the 
work or an individual authorized to act on behalf of the copyright 
owner. 
Notification must include: 
Identification of the copyrighted work, or, in the case of multiple 
works at the same location, a representative list of such works at that 
site. 
Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be 
the subject of infringing activity.  You must include sufficient 
information for us to locate the material (e.g., url, ip address, 
computer name). 
Information for us to be able to contact the complaining party (e.g., 
email address, phone number). 
A statement that the complaining party believes that the use of the 
material has not been authorized by the copyright owner or an 
authorized agent. 
A statement that the information in the notification is accurate and 
that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the 
copyright owner. 
DMCA Notifications, COPYRIGHT AT MIT, http://web.mit.edu/copyright/dmca-
notices/html (last visited Sept. 20, 2009). 
84 17 U.S.C. § 512(i). 
85 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners L.L.C., 718 F.3d 1006, 1026 
(9th Cir. 2013); Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1105 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010); Rossi 
v. Motion Picture Ass’n of America Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 2004); Xcentric 
Ventures L.L.C. v. Mediolex, Ltd., No. 12-CV-00130 (PHX) (GMS), 2012 WL 5269403, 
at *6–7 (D. Ariz. Oct. 24, 2012); Wolk v. Kodak Imaging Network, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 
724, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Capital Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, L.L.C., 821 F. Supp. 2d 
627, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
86 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012). 
2014] ISSUES AND BEST PRACTICES ON THE "CLOUD" 645 
	
decision of the Southern District of New York’s on remand87 are 
warranted. 
The Second Circuit agreed with the District Court’s initial 
holding that “actual knowledge or awareness of facts or 
circumstances that indicate specific and identifiable instances of 
infringement will disqualify an interactive service provider from 
the safe harbor,” but they disagreed with the District Court over 
whether or not YouTube had “specific knowledge or awareness.”88 
On appeal in the Second Circuit, the plaintiffs argued that the 
record raised material issues of fact regarding YouTube’s actual 
knowledge or “red flag” awareness of specific instances of 
infringement. 89  To that end, the plaintiffs pointed out various 
estimates regarding the percentage of infringing content on the 
YouTube Web site:  
For example, Viacom cite[d] evidence that 
YouTube employees conducted Web site surveys 
and estimated that 75–80% of all YouTube streams 
contained copyrighted material. The plaintiffs 
similarly claimed that Credit Suisse, acting as 
financial advisor to Google, estimated that more 
than 60% of YouTube’s content was ‘premium’ 
copyrighted content—and that only 10% of the 
premium content was authorized.90  
These percentages suggest that YouTube was conscious of the 
fact a significant amount of material on its website was infringing.  
Beyond the survey results, the plaintiffs reli[ed] 
upon internal YouTube communications that do 
refer to particular clips or groups of clips.  The . . . 
plaintiffs argue[d] that YouTube was aware of 
specific infringing material because, inter alia, 
YouTube attempted to search for specific Premier 
League videos on the site in order to gauge their 
                                                                                                             
87 Viacom Int’l, Inc v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-CV-2103 (LLS), 2013 WL 1689071 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2013). 
88 See YouTube II, 676 F.3d at 33. 
89 See id. at 30–31. 
90 See id. at 32–33. 
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“value based on video usage.”  In particular, the 
class plaintiffs cited a February 7, 2007 e-mail from 
Patrick Walker, director of video partnerships for 
Google and YouTube, requesting that his colleagues 
calculate the number of daily searches for the terms 
“soccer,” “football,” and “Premier League” in 
preparation for a bid on the global rights to Premier 
League content.  On another occasion, Walker 
requested that any “clearly infringing, official 
broadcast footage” from a list of top Premier 
League clubs—including Liverpool Football Club, 
Chelsea Football Club, Manchester United Football 
Club, and Arsenal Football Club—be taken down in 
advance of a meeting with the heads of “several 
major sports teams and leagues.”  YouTube 
ultimately decided not to make a bid for the Premier 
League rights, but the infringing content allegedly 
remained on the Web site.91 
The record in the [YouTube] action includes additional 
examples.92  YouTube founder Jawed Karim prepared a report in 
March 2006 which stated that “[a]s of today[,] episodes and clips 
of the following well-known shows can still be found [on 
YouTube]: Family Guy, South Park, MTV Cribs, Daily Show, 
Reno 911, [and] Dave Chapelle [sic].”  Karim further opined that 
“although YouTube is not legally required to monitor content . . . . 
and complies with DMCA takedown requests, we would benefit 
from preemptively removing content that is blatantly illegal and 
likely to attract criticism.”93  He also noted that “a more thorough 
analysis” of the issue would be required.94 
Several of the shows to which Karim referred are owned by 
Viacom: 
[I]n a July 4, 2005 e-mail exchange, YouTube 
founder Chad Hurley sent an e-mail to his co-
founders with the subject line “budlight 





2014] ISSUES AND BEST PRACTICES ON THE "CLOUD" 647 
	
commercials,” and stated, “we need to reject these 
too.” Steve Chen responded, “can we please leave 
these in a bit longer? another week or two can’t 
hurt.” Karim also replied, indicating that he “added 
back in all 28 bud videos.” Similarly, in an August 
9, 2005 e-mail exchange, Hurley urged his 
colleagues “to start being diligent about rejecting 
copyrighted / inappropriate content,” noting that 
“there is a cnn [sic] clip of the shuttle clip on the 
site today, if the boys from Turner would come to 
the site, they might be pissed?”  Again, Chen 
resisted: 
But we should just keep that stuff on the site. I 
really don’t see what will happen. what? [sic] 
someone from cnn sees it? he happens to be 
someone with power? he happens to want to take it 
down right away. he gets in touch with cnn legal.  2 
weeks later, we get a cease & desist letter. we take 
the video down. 
And again, Karim agreed, indicating that “the CNN 
space shuttle clip, I like. We [sic] can remove it 
once we’re bigger and better known, but for now 
that clip is fine.”95 
The Second Circuit was convinced that the plaintiffs: 
[M]ay have raised a material issue of fact regarding 
YouTube’s knowledge or awareness of specific 
instances of infringement . . . . On these facts, a 
reasonable juror could conclude that YouTube had 
actual knowledge of specific infringing activity, or 
was at least aware of facts or circumstances from 
which specific infringing activity was apparent.96 
The appellate court continued, “Accordingly, we hold that 
summary judgment to YouTube on all clips-in-suit, especially in 
the absence of any detailed examination of the extensive record on 
                                                                                                             
95 Id. at 33–34. 
96 Id. at 34. 
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summary judgment, was premature.”97  On the issue of willful 
blindness, the court stated, a person is “willfully blind” or engages 
in “conscious avoidance” amounting to knowledge where the 
person “‘was aware of a high probability of the fact in dispute and 
consciously avoided confirming that fact.’”98  The Second Circuit 
remanded the case to the Southern District of New York.99 
On remand, the Southern District of New York granted 
YouTube’s motion for summary judgment again.100 Despite the 
findings of the Second Circuit, the Southern District held in favor 
of YouTube. 101   The court held that Congress had placed the 
burden squarely on the copyright holder or his agent(s) to identify 
infringements, and that Viacom had specifically not done so.102  
“YouTube submitted a list of 63,000 clips-in-suit, claimed it never 
received adequate notices of any of those infringements, and 
challenged plaintiffs to fill in the blanks specifying how they claim 
such notices was given.” 103   Viacom admitted that they were 
“unable to say which clips-in-suit [YouTube] knew about and 
which they did not . . . .”104 
The District Court found that “site traffic on YouTube had 
soared to more than 1 billion daily traffic views, with more than 24 
                                                                                                             
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 35 (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 983 F.2d 455, 458 (2d Cir. 1993)) 
(citing United States v. Aina-Marshall, 336 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
99 See id. at 41–42. 
100 See Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-CV-2103 (LLS) 2013 WL 1689071, 
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2013). 
101 See id. at *11. 
102 See id. at *2.  As stated in the Senate Report at pp. 46–47, and the House Report at 
55–56: 
Subsection (c)(3)(A)(iii) requires that the copyright owner or its 
authorized agent provide the service provider with information 
reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to identify and 
locate the allegedly infringing material.  An example of such 
sufficient information would be a copy or description  of the 
allegedly infringing material and the URL address of the location 
(web page) which is alleged to contain the infringing material.  The 
goal of this provision is to provide the service provider with adequate 
information to find and address the allegedly infringing material 
expeditiously. 
Id. 
103 Id. at *1. 
104 Id. 
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hours of new video uploaded to the site every minute, and the 
natural consequence that no service provider could possibly be 
aware of the contents of each such video.”105  YouTube was not 
liable for not removing material without receiving adequate 
notice.106 
Regarding the notice provision, the court held that “[t]he 
system is entirely workable; In 2007 Viacom itself gave such 
notice to YouTube of infringements by some 100,000 videos, 
which were taken down by YouTube by the next business day.”107  
The court continued, “Congress has determined that the burden of 
identifying what must be taken down is to be on the copyright 
owner, a determination which has proven practicable in 
practice.”108 
Viacom lacked proof that YouTube had knowledge that the 
clips-in-suit infringed. 109   Therefore, under the DMCA safe 
harbor, YouTube was not liable.110   The court looked at other 
theories of liability, such as “willful blindness”111 or “right and 
ability to control,”112  and also refused to hold YouTube liable 
under those theories.  Summary judgment was granted in favor of 
YouTube.113 
In virtually every case, if the defendant had the notice 
provisions in place, and if plaintiff(s) complied with the notice 
provisions, there was no liability if the defendant took the 
offending material down.  It should be noted that there was one 
recent case in which the “safe harbor” did not apply.  In Columbia 
Picture Industries, Inc. v. Fung, the defendant was liable under 
inducement of infringement for encouraging end users to upload 
and download copyrighted motion pictures through the use of a 
hybrid peer-to-peer file sharing protocol.114 
                                                                                                             
105 Id. at *2 (citation omitted). 
106 See id. at *3. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 See id. at *2. 
110 See id. at *3. 
111 Id. at *4. 
112 Id. at *5. 
113 See id. at *11. 
114 See Columbia Picture Industries, Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1049 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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In the case of a cloud provider and repository, an important 
issue is the proper party for receiving the notices.  Assuming the 
cloud provider aggregates access across multiple repositories 
through a common search or other function, there is a possibility 
that people will respond to the cloud provider as the gatekeeper on 
the frontend.  Further assuming that this search feature will deliver 
the user to the branded repository site, the cloud provider’s role 
may be more obviously limited.  In any event, best practice would 
suggest that the cloud provider include some type of conspicuous 
disclaimer on its search page effectively notifying users that the 
underlying content is provided by the applicable repository and 
that any user communications should be properly directed to the 
applicable repository owner.  Additionally, a process has to be put 
in place for cloud provider to notify the repository owner quickly 
and expeditiously if it nonetheless receives any DMCA notices so 
the repository owner can decide whether or not the material is 
infringing. 
Again, the institution should contractually retain responsibility 
for copyright claims arising in connection with repository content 
posted by the institution as a user in its agreement with the cloud 
provider.  Neither party should be obligated to indemnify the other 
for copyright liability associated with content posted by third-party 
users in the repository, except to the extent it breaches specific 
contractual obligations with respect to the handling of copyright 
infringement claims.  In the contract, the repository owner should 
assume overall DMCA compliance responsibility, with an 
obligation to post and follow compliant DMCA notice and 
takedown provisions on its site.  However, best practice would 
suggest that the cloud provider contractually agree to include 
effective notice to users on its site about this responsibility and 
follow mutually agreed notice procedures to forward any 
misdirected DMCA notices it does receive to the appropriate party. 
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IV. FAIR USE 
A. Background 
During the major “overhaul” of the U.S. copyright statutes that 
ultimately resulted in the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress decided 
to expressly include fair-use provisions in the federal copyright 
statutes.115  In many, if not most, situations at both the federal and 
state levels in which a common-law doctrine is codified, the 
legislature acts with a degree of specificity to create more certainty 
and guidance in the law.116  One would have thought, therefore, 
that by codifying the fair-use doctrine, the U.S. Congress wanted 
to do the same. The legislative history of section 107, however, 
indicates just the contrary.  Congress decided to add “fair use” to 
the new Act in a way that would maintain the status quo: 
While the statutory language provides some 
guidance as to the types of factors to consider, the 
factors are not exhaustive. There are no consistent 
rules regarding how much weight to give any factor. 
The language in Section 107 provides judges who 
interpret the law plenty of “wiggle room” to 
essentially arrive at almost any decision in any 
case.117 
Moreover, as in any exercise of linguistic interpretation, 
especially one that deals with a concept so nebulous and illusory as 
“fairness,” judges will inevitably bring their own values and 
ideologies into their analyses, consciously or unconsciously. After 
approximately 45 years of judicial case-by-case interpretation of 
the fair use provisions in the U.S. Code, there is far too much 
uncertainty with respect to which uses will be considered to be 
“fair” and which will infringe.118 
                                                                                                             
115 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
116 See Quintin Johnstone, An Evaluation of the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 
Faculty Scholarship Series, Yale L.S. Faculty Scholarship Series at 18 (1954). 
117 See H. R. REP. NO. 84-1976, 94th Cong., 2d sess. 65-66 (1976). 
118 Michael Landau, “Fair Use” Under U.S. Copyright Law 2 (IPRinfo Special Issue, 
Sept. 2006). 
It is also interesting to note that although the United States is a 
member of the Berne Convention and also a signatory to the TRIPS 
Agreement and WIPO Copyright Treaty, there is never any mention 
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Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 
106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including 
such use as reproductions in copies or phonorecords 
or by any other means specified by that section, for 
purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research is not an 
infringement of copyright. In determining whether 
the use made of a work is fair use the following 
factors to be considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used 
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work. 
                                                                                                             
anything that even remotely resembles the “three-step test” in United 
States “fair use” cases or the Copyright Act of 1976. 
Id. 
In a nutshell, the three-step test “sets limits to limitations on exclusive rights” and allows 
limitations: (a) in certain special cases; (b) that do not conflict with the normal 
exploitation of the work; and (c) that do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the author/right-holder.  Today, the three-step test appears not only in the 
Berne Convention but also in the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS), the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT).  Moreover, several European Directives 
contain the test. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
art. 9(2), July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, as amended S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1979); 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 13, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), art. 10, Dec 20, 1996, S. 
Treaty Doc No. 105-17 (1997), 2186 U.N.T.S 121; WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty, art. 16, S. Treaty Doc No. 105-17 (1997), WPPT 2186 U.N.T.S. 203; see also M. 
Senftleben, Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step Test—An Analysis of the Three-
Step Test in International and EC Copyright Law 4 (Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague (2004)). 
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The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself 
bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made 
upon consideration of all of the above factors.119 
B. Transformative Use Analysis 
In recent years, however, “transformative use,” a doctrine that 
is not mentioned at all in the statute, has entered into and has, in 
fact, dominated the analysis of the first factor, if not the entire fair-
use analysis.120  “Transformative Use” was advocated in a law 
review article penned by Judge Pierre Leval, Toward Developing A 
Fair Use Standard. 121   Judge Leval believed that if one uses 
another’s copyrighted material in a way that is sufficiently 
“transformative” so that the resultant new work serves a different 
purpose from that of the original, and does not supplant the 
demand for the original, the use should likely be fair.122   The 
creator of the new work is serving one of the purposes of copyright 
law, “ . . . to promote the Progress of Science and the useful 
Arts.”123 
The “transformative use” doctrine was cited with approval by 
the Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, a case involving the 
                                                                                                             
119 17 U.S.C. § 107.  The last sentence of section 107 was added in 1992, largely in 
response to Harper & Row Pubs., Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) and its 
progeny. 
120 See Pierre Leval, Toward Developing a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1105, 1111 (1990). 
121 See id. 
122 See id.  Much of the logic in Judge Leval’s article is influenced by Justice Story’s 
1841 Folsom v. Marsh decision. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (C.C.D. Mass. 
1841).  It is important to note, however, that at the time that Folsom was decided in 
1841, the exclusive rights were limited to the rights of “printing, publishing, selling or 
disposing.” Id. at 349.  There was no exclusive right to prepare “derivative works,” such 
as adaptations or translations.  For example, in Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 208 
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853), the German translation of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s famous novel, 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin, was held to not infringe because it was not a “copy” or 
“reproduction” of the original work.  The statutory rights are different today.  Section 
106(2) of the 1976 Act grants copyright holders the exclusive right “to prepare derivative 
works.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).  A “derivative work” is defined in section 101 as “a work 
based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, 
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, 
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, 
or adapted.” Id. §101. 
123 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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issue of whether 2 Live Crew’s parody of the Roy Orbison song, 
“Pretty Woman” was a fair use. 124   Although the case was 
reversed and remanded based upon legal error and never decided 
fully on the merits by the Supreme Court, the opinion does contain 
the language, “the more transformative the new work, the less will 
be the significance of the other factors, like commercialism, that 
may weigh against a finding of fair use.”125  Since the Acuff-Rose 
decision, every defendant in a copyright infringement case now 
chants the mantra of “transformative use” in an attempt to 
convince a court that its appropriation of copyrighted material 
should be “fair use.”126 
This trend has been gaining momentum in recent years.  In 
fact, if one looks at the modern fair use cases, “transformative use” 
appears to be the only major factor, with one factor regarding the 
market to be a minor factor.127  In reality, in a transformative use 
case, the “fair use” factors are really only these two: 
1) Is the use “transformative.” (Has the second user 
added some function, purpose, or even just other 
material?); and 
2)  Does the use supplant or usurp the market for 
the original.128 
We will now address a few recent relevant “fair use” cases that 
may have an impact on the cloud, notwithstanding the CDA or the 
DMCA. 
Transformative use has played a major part in recent parody 
cases.129  In SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., the Eleventh 
                                                                                                             
124 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
125 Id. at 569. 
126 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir. 
2003); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 1998). 
127 See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 
U. PA. L. REV. 549, 597 (2008); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 715 (2011). 
128 The AU Center for Social Media has phrased it slightly differently: “(1) Is the re-use 
‘transformative’—that is, does it add value to and repurpose preexisting material for a 
new audience meaning has it been put to a new use or purpose from the original work? 
(2) Is the amount of material taken appropriate to the re-use?” AU Center for Social 
Media, Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for OpenCourseWare, available at 
centerforsocialmedia.org/ocw. 
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Circuit held that a The Wind Done Gone, parody of the famous 
Civil War novel, Gone With the Wind, was sufficiently 
“transformative” to be a fair use, despite acknowledging that the 
defendant appropriated substantial copyrighted portions of the 
book.130  No harm to the potential market was found because the 
estate of Margaret Mitchell would never agree at any time to 
license rights to make a sequel to Gone with the Wind that is told 
from the vantage point of an African-American slave who was the 
half-sister of Scarlet O’Hara and in which the character of Ashley 
Wilkes was gay.131 
In Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., the Second Circuit 
held that an advertising photograph showing the body of a 
pregnant woman and the face of male actor Leslie Nielsen, was a 
“transformative use” of photographer Annie Leibovitz’s 
copyrighted photograph of a pregnant actress Demi Moore.132  In 
Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., a series of photographs 
entitled “Food Chain Barbie,” that depicted an often nude Barbie 
Doll posed in various positions while being attacked by vintage 
household appliances was sufficiently “transformative” because it 
parodied the character Barbie and did not supplant the demand for 
the original doll.133 
“Transformative use” does not only apply to parody.  A use 
may be classified as “transformative” if it serves a purpose or 
function that is different from that of the original copyrighted 
work. 134   For example, in Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling 
Kindersley Ltd., the reproduction and inclusion of seven Grateful 
                                                                                                             
129 See generally Netanel, supra note 127. 
130 269 F.3d 1258, 1280 (11th Cir. 2001), reh’g denied, 275 F.3d 58 (11th Cir. 2001). 
131 Id. at 1277.  The Second Circuit has been protective of authors’ copyrights.  In 
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010), the court denied the claim of 
“transformative,” noting that the novel was merely a sequel.  In order for the book to be 
a transformative work, something other than new expression has to be added.  It had to 
have been created for a different purpose, such as criticism or comment.  In Warner 
Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), the Second 
Circuit had to rule on whether the Harry Potter lexicon was infringing.  The court held 
that parts were transformative, but the extensive copying was not.  All in all, it was 
deemed to be an infringing work. 
132 See 137 F.3d 109, 137 (2d Cir. 1998). 
133 See 353 F.3d 792, 800–03 (9th Cir. 2003). 
134 See id. at 800–01. 
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Dead concert posters in a book about the band titled Illustrated 
Trip was held to be “transformative” because of both the 
differences in size and purpose of the graphics.135  The purpose of 
the defendant’s use was to help to illustrate and document the 
progression of concerts that took place during the book’s timeline, 
while the purpose and character of the use of the original posters 
themselves was “artistic expression and promotion.”136  The use 
of the posters was held to be fair.137 
Recently, in Blanch v. Koons, the artist, Jeff Koons’ use of an 
altered advertising photograph was held to be sufficiently 
“transformative,” and therefore fair.138  The plaintiff, a fashion 
photographer, had produced the photograph at issue in the case, 
Silk Sandals by Gucci, for a display advertisement in Allure 
magazine, a lifestyle magazine, as part of an article about “metallic 
makeup.”139  Koons on the other hand had included a portion of 
the photograph, along with other material and other fashion shots, 
in his mural titled, “Niagara,” which was for the Berlin 
Guggenheim Museum.140  The court cited Bill Graham Archives 
and stated, “[w]hen, as here, the copyrighted work is used as ‘raw 
material’ in furtherance of a distinct creative or communicative 
objectives, the use is transformative.”141  The Blanch photograph 
and Koons’ use had “entirely different purpose and meaning.”142 
C. Verbatim Copying: The Next Frontier 
In recent cases—many involving verbatim copying put to 
another purpose—the courts have been exceedingly pro-fair use.143  
In dealing with the Internet, the courts have been even more pro-
fair use.144  In Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,145 the plaintiff was a 
                                                                                                             
135 See 448 F.3d 605 at 611–12 (9th Cir. 2006). 
136 See id. at 609. 
137 See id. at 615. 
138 See 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006). 
139 See id. at 247–48. 
140 See id. at 248. 
141 See id. at 253 (citation omitted). 
142 Id. 
143 See cases cited infra Parts IV.C, IV.D. 
144 336 F.3d 811, 815 (9th Cir. 2003). 
145 Id. 
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professional photographer whose primary market was 
photographic images of the American West.146  He sued a search 
engine, ArribaSoft for copyright infringement for displaying 
reproductions of photographs from his website as small 
“thumbnails” in its image search results.147  The court held that 
the display of the thumbnail images was transformative and 
therefore “fair use” because it primarily served a purpose other 
than that of the original photographs. 148   The use of the 
copyrighted images by the search engine functioned primarily as a 
utilitarian tool to locate and facilitate easier access to images on 
Internet websites, not as a medium for displaying photographs.149  
There was, therefore, no overlap or substitution in the 
marketplace.150  The same result was found in Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Amazon, Inc.151 The Ninth Circuit held that the transformativeness 
of the use—finding material on the original web pages152—was 
more important than the normal market use, which was the 
uploading of “adult photographs” onto cellular telephones.153  If 
the use is transformative, the fourth factor is less important.154 
In A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, L.L.C.,155 the Fourth 
Circuit held that even verbatim copying may be a fair use if the use 
is for a different purpose than the original.156  iParadigms runs a 
service, Turnitin, that can check students’ research papers for 
plagiarism. 157   Schools that subscribed to the service would 
require their students “to upload the students’ term papers onto the 
Turnitin website.”158  Turnitin would then compare the students’ 
papers with its electronic database of published articles and 
                                                                                                             
146 See id. at 815. 
147 See id. 
148 See id. at 819. 
149 See id. 
150 See id. at 821. 
151 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
152 See id. at 1165. 
153 See id. at 1166. 
154 Id. (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)). 
155 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009). 
156 See id. at 639. 
157 See id. at 634. 
158 Netanel, supra note 127, at 764. 
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previously uploaded papers for plagiarism.159  A group of students 
sued the service for copyright infringement.160 
The court found that the use was a fair use, mainly because it 
was transformative.161 The use was to prevent plagiarism.162  That 
was a totally different purpose from the purpose that the students 
wrote the papers in the first place.163  The court noted that a use 
may be transformative without adding anything to it, if it is used 
for a different purpose than the original.164  The Fourth Circuit 
also noted the third factor does not count against fair use if it was 
reasonably necessary for the transformative use to copy the 
underlying work in its entirety.165 
D. Educational Fair Use 
There are two cases that were decided in 2012 that have 
expanded fair use in the educational context a great deal—
Cambridge University Press v. Becker166 and Authors Guild, Inc. 
v. HathiTrust. 167   In Cambridge University Press v. Becker, 
Georgia State University was sued for digitizing chapters of books 
and journal articles without authorization and putting them on 
reserve in the library for the students’ use.168  The case is long, 
and goes over the analysis underlying book by underlying book, so 
we will only summarize it here.  The case does have several 
interesting holdings for our purposes. 
The first is that the court distinguished Kinkos169 and Michigan 
Document Services,170 cases in which copying of academic course 
                                                                                                             
159 See A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, L.L.C., 562 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 
2009). 
160 See id. at 635. 
161 See id. at 640. 
162 Id. 
163 See id. 
164 See id. at 639. 
165 See id. at 642. 
166 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012). 
167 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
168 See Cambridge Univ. Press, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1201. 
169 Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
170 Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 
1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1156 (1997); see also Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco 
Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y.1992), aff’d, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (Texaco was not a 
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packs was held to be infringement, by stating that those cases 
involved for-profit enterprises. 171   Georgia State University, in 
contrast, is a non-profit educational institution, and therefore is 
different.172   The next holding deals with de minimis copying.  
The court held that even though a work had been digitized, 
uploaded, and downloaded by the professor and the library staff, if 
not enough students had downloaded the article, it was de minimis, 
and did not infringe.173   This is an interesting take on the de 
minimis doctrine.  Regarding the second factor, the nature of the 
work, the Northern District of Georgia held that all of the works 
were informational, because they were used for classroom 
instruction, regardless of their actual content.174 
Regarding the third factor, the court came up with its own 
standard and interesting determination as to what work constitutes 
the original work for purposes of the fair-use analysis, which looks 
suspiciously like a “bright line” test, that courts are not supposed to 
adopt.175   It is also counterintuitive in its logic.  If a book or 
journal has ten chapters or fewer, up to 10% of the book may be 
taken.176  If a book, however, has eleven chapters or greater, then 
only one chapter may be taken.177  For the issue of market harm, 
this was counterintuitive, also.  If the plaintiff had decided to 
license the work at issue, then to not pay the license fee favored the 
plaintiff.  If, however, the plaintiff did not have a market 
established for digital licensing, or if the plaintiff had decided not 
to license the book chapter-by-chapter, then to not pay favored the 
                                                                                                             
case with course packs, but isolated copies of journal articles.  The court found the use to 
not be a fair use based largely on the for-profit nature of the commercial enterprise.). 
171 See Cambridge Univ. Press, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1224. 
172 See id. 
173 See id. at 1238–39, 1245. 
174 See id. at 1242. 
175 “Fair Use” is supposed to be handled on a case-by-case, or ad hoc, basis without any 
definite amount of the work that is considered to be unfair.  The fact that the court is 
using a definite percentage of the copyrighted work to determine the third factor of fair 
use is highly unusual. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) 
(The task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it 
recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis); see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 531, 560 (1985); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984). 
176 Cambridge Univ. Press, 863 F. Supp. 2d. at 1243. 
177 Id. 
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defendant.  In many of the cases, it was a fair use to simply not 
pay because the plaintiff did not have an established market in the 
digital work or had decided not to license it. 
Many of the books or journals at issue were knocked out 
because of technical standing or contract issues, or because the 
plaintiffs could not prove originality.178  All in all, only five out of 
74 excerpts at issue infringed.179   Cambridge University Press 
could have implications for third-party unlicensed use of excerpts 
of the works. 
A more important case is Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust180, 
for it contains a holding that could have profound importance all of 
the mass digitization cases.  In HathiTrust, several universities 
made an arrangement with Google to digitize their entire 
libraries.181   As per the arrangement, after digitization, Google 
retained a copy of the digital book to be available through Google 
Books, an online system that allows Google users to search the 
content and view “snippets” of the books:182 
Google also provide[d] a digital copy of each 
scanned work to the Universities, which included 
scanned image files of the pages and a text file from 
the printed work . . . . After Google provide[d] the 
Universities with digital copies of their [library 
holdings], the Universities then “contribute[d]” 
these digital copies to the HathiTrust Digital 
Library (“HDL”).183 
The HathiTrust partnership is in the process of creating “a 
shared digital repository that already contains almost 10 million 
                                                                                                             
178 See generally Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 
2012) (discussing throughout the opinion how several of the alleged fringed material that 
not meet the originality requirement). 
179 See id. at 1363–64. 
180 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
181 Id. at 448. 
182 See id. 
183 Id. 
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digital volumes.” 184   The Authors Guild sued HathiTrust and 
several university personnel.185 
The court, on summary judgment, ruled that the uses to which 
the books were put was transformative and, therefore, fair use.186 
A transformative use may be one that actually 
changes the original work. However, a 
transformative use can also be one that serves an 
entirely different purpose . . . The use to which the 
works in the HDL are put is transformative because 
the copies serve an entirely different purpose than 
the original works: the purpose is superior search 
capabilities rather than actual access to copyrighted 
material. The search capabilities of the HDL have 
already given rise to new methods of academic 
inquiry such as text mining.187 
The court also held that 
The use of digital copies to facilitate access for 
print-disabled persons is also transformative. Print-
disabled individuals are not considered to be a 
significant market or potential market to publishers 
and authors. As a result, the provision of access for 
them was not the intended use of the original work 
(enjoyment and use by sighted persons) and this use 
is transformative.188 
Fair use is a perplexing and changing doctrine, often left to the 
judges themselves to fashion.  There is, however, a trend toward 
transformative use that has been growing over the years.  The 
recent case, HathiTrust, in which the digitization of entire libraries 
was considered to be transformative because digital versions, or 
computerized versions, have “text searching” ability is a new and 
major expansion of the doctrine.  It is buttressed by the holding 
                                                                                                             
184 Id. 
185 See id. at 448 (“Google’s use of the digital works is the subject of a separate 
lawsuit.”). 
186 See id. at 460. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 461. 
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that providing access to the “sight disabled” is a fair use, as well.189  
As it continues to evolve and expand, particularly in the 
educational-use context, the concept of transformative use may 
have important implications for the OER movement by providing a 
robust fair-use defense in support of the creation and widespread 
distribution of teaching, learning, and research resources designed 
to increase educational opportunity and development on a global 
scale through greater access and relevance. 
V. MORAL RIGHTS OR LE DROIT MORAL 
Moral Rights or Le Droit Moral190 is originally a Continental 
European doctrine that respects the personal rights, along with the 
property rights,191 that are attached to a work of art or literature.  
Moral Rights legislation is found in Article 6bis of the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.192  
After initially rejecting all moral rights legislation, a compromise 
regarding moral rights led to the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 
and permitted the United States to become a member of the Berne 
Convention in 1988, effective March 1, 1989.193  As of September 
                                                                                                             
189 See also Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(decided largely on the same grounds as the Hathitrust case).  It is interesting that the 
author of the opinion, Judge Chin, was the exact same judge who did not accept the 
proposed settlement in the case in 2011 because it was “not fair, adequate, and 
reasonable.” Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011).  Two years later, he ruled against the plaintiffs, giving them nothing at all. 
190 Technically called Les Droits Moraux, it has been singularized to Le Droit Moral 
and will be used in the singular in this Article. 
191 Copyright is considered a property right; moral rights, such as the right of attribution 
(paternity) and the right of integrity, are personal rights. See, e.g., Understanding 
Copyright and Related Rights, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/
intproperty/909/wipo_pub_909.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
192 See The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 
6bis, Sept. 9, 1886, revised and amended through Sept. 28, 1971, 102 Stat. 2853, 828 
U.N.T.S. I-11850, [hereinafter Berne Convention].  The Berne Convention is an 
international agreement governing copyright, which was first accepted in Berne, 
Switzerland, in 1886.  It has been amended and joined by additional nations at various 
times. 
193 The United States initially refused to become a party to the Convention, since that 
would have required major changes in its Copyright law, particularly with regard to 
moral rights, removal of the general requirement for registration of copyright works, and 
elimination of mandatory copyright notice. See, e.g., William Patry, The United States 
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2013, there are 167 contracting parties to the Berne Convention.194  
The Berne Convention provides reciprocal copyright protection for 
its members, and once a work is protected in one country, it is 
afforded protection in all.195 
The major moral rights are (1) the right of attribution 
(paternity), and (2) the right of integrity, which allows an artist or 
author to object to modifications, alterations, or mutilations that 
are prejudicial to his or her honor. 196   The Berne Convention 
requires that the moral rights be independent of the author’s 
economic rights.197  Moral rights are only accorded to individual 
authors, not to owners through assignment, license, or transfer.198  
Moral rights may be waived in some countries.199 
In the United States, since 2003, false attribution claims have 
not been actionable under the Lanham Act owing to Dastar Corp. 
v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.200  In Dastar, the Supreme 
Court held that the Lanham Act 201  does not prevent the 
unaccredited copying of a work, and held that Dastar was free to 
commercialize and distribute a video that it had copied and edited 
                                                                                                             
and International Copyright Law: From Berne to Eldred, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 749, 750–52 
(2003). 
194 Contracting Parties: Berne Convention, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/
ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=15 (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
195 See Berne Convention, supra note 192, art. 5. 
196 There are actually five different rights that are included in Moral Rights: (1) the 
right to create or not to create, (2) the right of respect (the right to determine 
completeness of a project), (3) the right to disclose, or to withdraw from display, (4) the 
right of attribution (paternity), and (5) the right of integrity (the right to prevent 
modifications, distortions, or mutilations that are prejudicial to one’s reputation). See 
LEONARD D. DUBOFF, SHERRI BURR & MICHAEL MURRAY, ART LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 167–82 (rev. ed. 2010). 
197 See Berne Convention, supra note 192, art. 6bis. 
198 See Understanding Copyright and Related Rights, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int
/freepublications/en/intproperty/909/wipo_pub_909.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
199 See, e.g., Gerald Dworkin, The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the 
Common Law Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 229, 244–45 (1995). 
200 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).  For a 
thorough discussion of the Dastar decision and its ramifications, see Michael Landau, 
Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox: The Need for Stronger Protection of Attribution Rights 
in the United States, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 273 (2005). 
201 The Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127). 
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and that was originally made by Fox.202  The Supreme Court held 
that “as used in the Lanham Act, the phrase ‘origin of goods’ is in 
our view incapable of connoting the person or entity that originated 
the ideas or communications that ‘goods’ embody or contain. Such 
an extension would not only stretch the text, but it would be out of 
accord with the history and purpose of the Lanham Act and 
inconsistent with precedent.”203 The court stated that “allowing a 
cause of action under § 43(a) . . . would create a species of mutant 
copyright law that limits the public’s federal right to ‘copy and to 
use’ expired copyrights.”204  While the motion picture/video was 
in the public domain because it was not renewed, the opinion is not 
so narrow as to apply to only public domain works.205  It has been 
followed in cases in which the copyright has expired and in cases 
in which the copyright is in full force.206 
In the cases that have followed Dastar, claims for an 
attribution right in both copyrighted and public domain works did 
not make it past a motion to dismiss.207  It is therefore unlikely 
that any author who was listed on a changed work, or not listed on 
his/her own work, would have an action under the Lanham Act for 
attribution.  It should be noted that the right of attribution is not 
one of the bundle of rights that is listed in Section 106 of the 
                                                                                                             
202 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37–38. 
203 Id. at 32. 
204 Id. at 34.  Justice Scalia was seemingly confusing the purposes of copyright and 
trademark law.  Copyright law governs the use of the work; trademark law insures that 
customers are not confused by requiring truthful labeling of and statements about the 
goods and services. 
205 See, e.g., Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 
2003) (holding that Dastar applies to copyrighted works as well as public domain works). 
206 See, e.g., Chivalry Film Prods. v. NBC Universal, Inc., No. 05-CV-5627 (GEL), 
2006 WL 89944, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2006) (misattributed screenplay); A Slice of 
Pie Prods. L.L.C. v. Wayans Bros. Entm’t, 392 F. Supp. 2d 297, 312–14 (D. Conn. 2005) 
(misattributed screenplay); Mays v. Euler, 370 F. Supp. 2d 362, 370–71 (D. Md. 2005) 
(no claim for lack of attribution for a web design portfolio); Keane v. Fox, 297 F. Supp. 
2d 921, 934–36 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (claim dismissed against person who allegedly 
developed the idea for “American Idol”); Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F. 
Supp. 2d 1177, 1179 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (misattributed narration script and editing work). 
207 See JANE C. GINSBURG, JESSICA LITMAN & MARY L. KELVIN, TRADEMARK AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 668 (4th ed. 2007). 
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Copyright Act of 1976. 208   Therefore, it is doubtful that an 
attribution action would stand under the Copyright Act. 
Regarding the right of integrity, in the United States, with the 
exception of “works of visual art,”209 the right of integrity is based 
on whether the license contains the right to prepare a derivative 
work210 or its equivalent, and is solely handled by contract (or 
license).211  To the extent many, if not all, works in a repository 
are licensed under a Creative Commons license that allows 
“Adaptations,” the author probably would have given away any 
right to object to changes.212  Care, though, must be taken to take 
                                                                                                             
208 Exclusive rights in copyrighted works: 
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under 
this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the 
following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to 
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, 
or lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic 
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual 
works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic 
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, 
including the individual images of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work 
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission. 
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
209 Id. § 101 (definition of “work of visual art”). 
210 See Id. § 106(2). 
211 See, e.g., Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 20–21 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(Unauthorized derivative work was prepared.  The BBC, the original licensor, had only 
licensed the rights to broadcast and to sublicense the work, therefore ABC did not have 
the right to cut 27% out of the show without permission.); see also Vargas v. Esquire, 
Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 525 (7th Cir. 1947) (Contract transferred all rights to Esquire 
Magazine.  There was no violation of a right of attribution or integrity when Esquire 
published drawings as “Esquire Girls” without attributing the artist, Alberto Vargas). 
212 “Adaptations” is another way of saying “derivative works.”  Section 101 defines 
“derivative works” as follows: 
A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting 
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, 
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art 
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a 
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of 
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a look at which license was used to see whether any potential 
changes may be made to a licensed work.  A requirement by the 
repository for end users of OER materials to post or publish only 
under a Creative Commons license may mitigate risks associated 
with derivative works and any right of integrity. 
The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA)213 is an art-
preservation act that applies to a minimum class of specified works 
called “works of visual art” in the Copyright Act.  It only applies 
to original works of visual art, and does not apply to motion 
pictures or audiovisual works, reproductions of works, or works 
made for hire. As such, it is doubtful that there would be any 
VARA-defined work included in a repository. 
                                                                                                             
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, 
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 
“derivative work”. 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). 
213 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A.  The Visual Artists Rights 
Act of 1990 (VARA) is really an art preservation act, instead of an act that truly gives 
attribution and integrity rights to authors.  This is because of the very limited coverage 
of VARA.  VARA only applies to works of visual art and defines a “work of visual art” 
as: 
(1) a painting, drawing, print or sculpture, existing in a single copy, 
in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and 
consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, 
in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that 
are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or 
other identifying mark of the author; or 
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, 
existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited 
edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively 
numbered by the author. 
17 U.S.C. § 101. 
It does not include: 
(A) (i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, 
model, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, 
magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information 
service, electronic publication, or similar publication; 
     (ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, 
descriptive, covering, or packaging material or container; 
     (iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii); 
(B) any work made for hire; or 
(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title. 
Id. 
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The ability to remix works in the OER forum opens an 
opportunity for claims of moral rights outside the United States 
and claims in the nature of moral rights within the United States.214  
Notice provisions and disclaimers indicating that a work has been 
altered without the express approval of the creator may be useful to 
mitigate against this risk.  Additionally, implementation of a 
technical application or feature designed to track, record, and show 
edits by contributor may further mitigate integrity risk.  This 
application may be available through the Creative Commons 
license or provided locally by the repository or at the cloud level as 
part of the provider’s hosting package.  At least within the United 
States, the repository’s terms of use should include an express 
waiver from the creator when possible to help mitigate risk of a 
claim of or in the nature of moral rights. 
VI. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
In the United States, state universities are protected by the 
doctrine of state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.215  Under sovereign 
immunity, a state is absolutely immune from monetary damages 
for infringement of intellectual property, unless it consents to suit 
or waives its immunity.216  Since the late 1990s, case after case 
did not make it past a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity 
grounds.217 
                                                                                                             
214 See, e.g., GEORGE B. DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, LAW OF THE INTERNET § 5.03 
(3rd ed. 2013). 
215 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (holding that the 
Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution trumps any attempt under Article I of the 
Constitution to abrogate sovereign immunity); see also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank (Florida Prepaid I), 527 U.S. 627, 635–48 (1999) 
(holding that any patent law abrogation was unconstitutional, and that there was no 
Fourteenth Amendment taking); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd. (Florida Prepaid II), 527 U.S. 666, 673–75 (1999) (holding that any 
trademark law abrogation was unconstitutional, and that there was no property interest in 
freedom from false advertising); Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 607–08 
(5th Cir. 2000) (holding that any copyright law abrogation was unconstitutional). 
216 See Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 54. 
217 See, e.g., Mktg. Info. Masters, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univ. Sys., 552 F. 
Supp. 2d. 1088, 1098–99 (S.D. Cal. 2008); Salerno v. City Univ. of N.Y., 191 F. Supp. 
2d 352, 355–56 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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There is an exception to the general rule of sovereign 
immunity.  Under Ex Parte Young, an action for prospective 
injunctive relief may be brought against state officials or 
employees acting in their official capacity.218  In order to bring the 
suit, however, the cause of action must be brought against the 
officials in their named capacity, not the university. 219   An 
example of this is the lawsuit against Georgia State University, 
Cambridge University Press v. Becker.220  The suit was brought 
against the President, Provost, Librarian, and others who worked at 
the university—not directly against the university.221  Again, the 
most that can happen is that the university will have to stop future 
infringements. 222   There cannot be monetary liability for past 
infringement, no matter how egregious the infringement.223  There 
can, however, be a discretionary award of attorneys’ fees to the 
“prevailing party.”224 
Sovereign immunity has been a doctrine in flux over the years.  
The cases that firmly established state sovereign immunity were 
decided by a split Supreme Court.225  The legal landscape may 
change at some time, but for now, state universities have the 
advantage of sovereign immunity being on their side.  State 
repositories accustomed to the protection afforded by sovereign 
immunity may be reluctant to assume liability in the form of 
indemnification to the cloud provider and may, in fact, be limited 
by state law from doing so.226  A complete analysis of how the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity may inform the risk allocation 
                                                                                                             
218 209 U.S. 123, 167–68 (1908). 
219 See Cambridge University Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1205–10 (N.D. 
Ga. 2012) 
220 See id. 
221 See id. at 1201. 
222 See id. at 1215 (describing Ex Parte Young as providing for injunctive and 
declaratory relief). 
223 See id. at 1206 (framing Ex Parte Young as only permitting prospective injunctive 
relief against continuing violations). 
224 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012). 
225 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); see also Florida Prepaid 
II, 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Florida Prepaid I, 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
226 See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 277 Ga. 248, 250 (2003) 
(finding that Georgia law did not permit municipalities to waive sovereign immunity and 
indemnify third parties). 
2014] ISSUES AND BEST PRACTICES ON THE "CLOUD" 669 
	
between a state repository and cloud provider is beyond the scope 
of this Article, but should be considered when applicable. 
CONCLUSION 
In furtherance of the OER movement and global education 
generally, the importance of a cloud strategy extends beyond cost 
savings and computing performance optimization for current 
business needs.  The cloud can enable new services for 
repositories and end users that can facilitate innovation and 
creativity in education.  Digital, social, and mobile media are 
fundamentally changing business models across industries as they 
transform communication and create new business opportunities, 
which may extend to education.  By placing OER materials in the 
cloud under a Creative Commons license that permits full remix 
rights, institutions will enable a new kind of global learning and 
collaboration.  Educational institutions and repositories can 
leverage emerging mobile and collaborative computing trends to 
extend resources and new services to students and faculty with 
fewer geographic-based limitations.  The cloud represents a 
critical component of this business innovation.  Additionally, the 
detailed usage and analytical information available through the 
cloud metering model will provide a new level of transparency 
around operations that may reveal opportunities to revise internal 
management and processes to drive further operational business 
efficiencies through a best practices approach. 
It should be noted that cloud solutions are not an all-or-nothing 
proposition.  It is possible that in considering the risk allocation 
and other issues, the institution may conclude that a hybrid data 
center model is appropriate, moving certain content to the cloud 
and retaining other content on its servers, yet providing a seamless 
experience to its end users through APIs and portals.  A 
comprehensive analysis of alternatives should include separate 
assessments of the key business features and requirements, such as 
quality control, security, availability and performance, associated 
with the each component of the repository, to determine the 
optimal solution for each type of functionality.  Generally 
speaking, functionality that demands greater control for any 
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number of legitimate business reasons, such as heightened security 
concerns, strong identification with the institution, or dynamic 
feature requirements, may not be appropriate for the public cloud.  
A thoughtful plan can manage the cloud-related business 
challenges on an individual component basis in order to meet 
acceptable enterprise risk tolerance levels and move forward to 
meet business needs without significant capital expenditure on 
hardware, software, and services. 
Finally, it is important to understand the scope of risk and 
differentiate between real and perceived risks.  Many risks and 
vulnerabilities are not isolated to the cloud but also exist to some 
extent in traditional systems, including proprietary university 
systems.  Further, some of these risks may be managed more 
efficiently in the cloud.  For example, while it is true that the 
complexity of security is increased under circumstances of widely 
dispersed data, cloud providers have sufficient scale and 
motivation to adopt and deploy more sophisticated security 
protections and they may be contractually required to do so. 
Similarly, concerns surrounding performance and availability 
issues are not new or unique to the cloud.  Service-level 
agreements may be included in contractual arrangements to hold 
the cloud provider to mutually agreed performance requirements 
that meet or exceed service levels available through a proprietary 
server system.  Indeed, many cloud-related issues and risks 
associated with the necessary loss of control to the institution may 
be effectively addressed and allocated through carefully considered 
contractual provisions. 
With respect to a contractual relationship whereby the 
repository owner desires to outsource all or a portion of the 
repository to a cloud provider on a true OER platform, allowing 
open access and full remixing opportunity, it seems relatively easy 
to determine what each party brings to the table.  The institution 
brings content and the cloud provider contributes a technology 
platform.  There are infringement risks associated with both the 
content and technology and risk allocation should address both.  
Although many of the content-risk cases discussed above address 
state claims in the nature of defamation, we recognize the 
existence of content-related risk associated with other types of 
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offensive and/or illegal speech, including obscenity, indecent 
materials, and content that could result in or further illegal acts.  
Thoughtful terms and policies should be posted on the sites to 
proactively restrict the posting of content deemed to be particularly 
risky or contrary to law, and a process should be put in place to 
enforce those terms and policies as necessary.  Use of technical 
tools to restrict access to or availability of certain types of high risk 
content may be helpful.227 
Finally, a significant aspect of any strategic plan to transition 
operations to the cloud should include an internal and external 
communication and education plan to overcome perceptions of 
increased risk and effectively manage actual risk.  Also, 
significant thought should be devoted to front-end operations by 
the institution responsible for the repository.  This includes 
effective notice and disclaimer provisions on the site, thoughtful 
terms of use and privacy policies, limitations as to who may 
publish works and under what terms (for example, Creative 
Commons228), and other quality control mechanisms.  While open 
systems may facilitate greater volume, there is also greater risk of 
content-based liability. Further, if additional volume does not serve 
the business purpose of the repository, it may create unnecessary 
and unwanted risk.  Front-end quality-type controls may be one 
the best ways to mitigate downstream risk.  Of course, there 
should also be a carefully negotiated commercial arrangement with 
the cloud provider to allocate risk in line with each party’s 
respective contributions and economic opportunities.  In a typical 
arrangement involving the provision of cloud services for a fee, the 
repository owner should assume overall DMCA compliance 
responsibility and agree to post DMCA notice and takedown 
procedures clearly and conspicuously on its site.  This should be 
reinforced by the cloud provider’s agreement to post a clear and 
conspicuous notice on the appropriate page of its site highlighting 
the repository’s process and the cloud provider’s contractual 
                                                                                                             
227 As with potential DMCA limits in circumstances of willful blindness, reason would 
suggest that there may be similar limits under the CDA in connection with knowing and 
egregious risk to national security. 
228 At the time of this writing, Creative Commons is seeking comments on version 4 of 
the Creative Commons licenses, so we expect the new versions to be available and 
recommended for use in the near term. 
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obligation to promptly forward any misdirected notices to the 
repository.  Should the cloud provider provide the hosting services 
in a co-branded environment, receive additional benefits through 
the hosting relationship, or contribute to the resources, the risk 
allocation should be adjusted to reflect the economics as well as 
the possibility of new risk. 
 
